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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
BURlV A, LLC, BRETT BARTEL, and 
ANDREW ROSENTHAL, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
RHETT DANIELS AND ELIZABETH 
TREZZA, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER 
Civil Action File No. 2016CV272965 
On March 21, 2016, Plaintiffs Buriva, LLC, Brett Bartel, and Andrew Rosenthal filed a 
Verified Complaint against Defendants Rhett Daniels and Elizabeth Trezza' seeking a 
declaration that Plaintiffs removal of Trezza as Buriva's Manager and Daniels as Chief Science 
Officer was proper and seeking injunctive relief prohibiting Trezza and Daniels from holding 
themselves out to the public as officers of Buriva. The Complaint alleges that Buriva's principal 
place of business is 1000 Parkwood Circle, Suite 900, Atlanta, Georgia 30339, Bartel is a Cobb 
County resident, and Rosenthal is a Florida resident. The Complaint does not allege the 
residence of Daniels or Trezza, but concludes venue is proper in Fulton County. However, 
Exhibit 1 of the Complaint, the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Buriva LLC, 
lists Daniels's address in Encinitas, California and Trezza's address in Fort Myers, Florida. 
Likewise, Exhibit 2 to the Complaint, a letter dated March 14, 2016, notifying Trezza and 
Daniels of the removals and appointments lists the same addresses. Buriva's Certificate of 
Organization issued by the State of Georgia's Secretary of State lists the Parkwood Circle 
I Daniels is a pro se defendant while Trezza is represented by counsel. 
2 The Certificate of Organization was filed as an Exhibit to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law Regarding Personal 
Jurisdiction of All Parties. At a hearing on injunctive relief, Judge Kimberly Esmond Adams, the previously 
assigned judge, requested the parties brief jurisdictional issues before she considered any requested relief. 
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address as both the principal place of business and the address of Buriva's registered agent and 
identifies this address as one in Cobb County. 
"Venue in equity cases lies 'in the county where a defendant resides against whom 
substantial relief is prayed. ", Agri-Cycle v. Couch, 284 Ga. 90, 91 (2008) (quoting Ga. Const. of 
1983, Ali. 6, Sec. 2, Para. III). From the pleadings, it is clear that no defendant is a resident of 
Fulton County or Georgia, and thus venue in Fulton County is improper. 
Plaintiffs argue Trezza and Daniels have waived any objection to venue by not 
affirmatively asserting the defense of improper venue. However, Trezza and Daniels have both 
contested personal jurisdiction, venue, and service of process in responsive pleadings and have 
repeated these defenses when specially appearing to file responsive pleadings to Plaintiffs' 
various motions for injunctive relief: 
• "I submit this Affidavit as a special and limited appearance only and reserve all 
my rights to contest this Court's personal jurisdiction, venue, and 
service/sufficiency of process." Aff. Of Elizabeth Trezza in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Emergency Declaratory Relief and Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (March 22, 2016) and Aff. Of 
Elizabeth Trezza In support of Her Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint 
(March 28, 2016); 
• Filing special appearance "without waiving her objection to personal 
jurisdiction, improper venue, sufficiency of service, lack of service, and the 
remaining defenses in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12" Opposition to Memorandum in 
Support of Emergency Motion for Declaratory Relief and Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (March 22, 2016) and 
Brief of Defendant Elizabeth Trezza in Further Opposition to Emergency 
Motion for Declaratory Relief and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction (March 28, 2016); 
• "The Plaintiffs have not alleged any grounds which demonstrate either of the 
Defendants are subject to the jurisdiction or venue of this COUli." Opposition to 
Memorandum in SUPPOli of Emergency Motion for Declaratory Relief and 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, p. 2 
(March 22,2016); 
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• "I submit this Affidavit as a special and limited appearance only and reserve all 
my rights to contest this Court's personal jurisdiction, venue, and 
service/sufficiency of process." Affidavit of Rhett Sean Daniels In Support of 
His Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint (March 30, 2016); 
• Filing special appearance "without subj ecting herself [sic] to the jurisdiction of 
this Court and without waiving his objection to personal jurisdiction, improper 
venue, sufficiency of service, lack of service, and the remaining defenses in 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12" Brief of Defendant Rhett Sean Daniels In Further 
Opposition to Emergency Motion for Declaratory Relief and Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (March 30, 2016); and 
• Trezza's Answer and Counterclaims by Special Appearance and Demand for 
Trial by Jury (denying venue is proper in Fulton County (~ 7) and filing "special 
appearance Counterclaim without subjecting herself to the Jurisdiction of this 
Court") (May 19,2016). 
"While it is not necessary to set forth in a responsive pleading reasons why venue is improper, in 
order to assert the defense, a defendant must make reference to venue." Coastal Transp., Inc. v. 
Tillery, 270 Ga. App. 135, 136 (2004) (quoting Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Morrison, 187 
Ga.App. 780, 782(3) (1988)) (finding appellants did not waive issue of venue when 18 months 
elapsed between filing answer and the filing of a motion to transfer); Agri-Cycle v. Couch, 284 
Ga. 90, 91 (2008) (noting venue objections should be raised in responsive pleadings or by 
motion to avoid waiver). Thus, it is clear that neither Defendant waived his or her defense of 
improper venue. 
Under Georgia's Constitution, "Any court shall transfer to the appropriate court in the 
state any civil case in which it determines that jurisdiction or venue lies elsewhere." Ga. Const. 
Art. VI, § 1, ~ VIII; see also Unif. Sup. Ct. Rule 19.1 (stating that a motion in a civil action 
asserting that venue is improper "shall be treated as a motion to transfer the action to another 
court, whether in the same or another county of this state."); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. 
Morrison, 187 Ga. App. 780,781 (1988). "The moving party shall specify the court(s) having 
jurisdiction and in which venue properly would lie." Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 19.1. The trial 
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court is "obligated to determine the county or counties in which venue properly lay." Coastal 
Transp., Inc. v. Tillery', 270 Ga. App. 135, 140 (2004). 
Here, the Court cannot determine a legal basis under which any Georgia county would be 
a proper venue and Defendants assert they are not subject to jurisdiction anywhere in Georgia. 
Given their objection to jurisdiction, Defendants cannot be expected to identify a proper venue in 
Georgia. Under Georgia law, venue for this equity action is only proper in Encinitas, California, 
or Fort Myers, Florida. It is nonsensical to require non-resident defendants to submit to yet 
another improper venue in Georgia. The Court of Appeals has recognized a similar predicament 
in dealing with transfers related to proper subject matter jurisdiction. McDonald v. Metro. 
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 2S 1 Ga. App. 230, 231 (2001) ("Reading OCGA § 9-11-12(h)(3) in 
harmony with the constitutional transfer directive, a court "shall dismiss" a civil action for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction only when there is no other Georgia court in which jurisdiction lies 
and to which the action could be transferred."). Because both Defendants are non-residents of 
Georgia and venue in any Georgia county has not been properly established, the Court hereby 
dismisses the action without prejudice. 
SO ORDERED this 0~ day of June, 2016. 
~~C~ 
JUDGE ELIZABETH E. LONG 
Superior COUlt of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
4 
Copies to: 
ALL REGISTERED USERS OF EFILEGA. 
,A~tQtn~Ys for PI~intif,fs Attorneys fQt Defendants 
Logan Winkles Mark Gilbert 
CANNON, MIHILL & WINKLES, LLC COLEMAN TALLEY LLP 
101 Marietta St. N.W. 910 N. Patterson St. 
Suite 3120 Valdosta, GA 31601 
Atlanta, GA 30303 Tel: (229) 242-7562 
Tel: (404) 891-6700 Fax: (229) 333-0885 
lwinkles@cmw-Iaw.com Mark.gilbert@colemantalley.com 
Counsel for Plaintiffs Buriva, LLC and Andrew Emily Macheski-Preston 
Rosenthal COLEMAN TALLEY LLP 
3475 Lenox Road NE, Suite 400 
Joshua P. Gunnemann Atlanta, GA 30326 
Julia B. Stone Tel: (770) 698-9556 
ROGERS & HARDIN LLP Fax: (770) 698-9729 
2700 International Tower Emily.Qreston@colemantalley.com 
229 Peachtree St. NE 
Atlanta, GA 30303 Jay J. Freireich 
Tel: (404) 522-4700 BRACH EICHLER LLC 
Fax: (404) 525-2224 101 Eisenhower Parkway 
jgunnemann@rh-Iaw.com Roseland, NJ 07068 
jstone@rh-Iaw.com Tel: (973) 364-5206 
Fax: (973) 618-5566 
Counsel for Plaintiff Brett Bartel ifreireich@bracheichler.com 
Counsel for Defendant Elizabeth Trezza 
Pro Se Litigant 
Rhett Sean Daniels 
seandanielsmsceaicould.com 
5 
